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Pull-based ID/LOC split protocols, such as LISP (RFC6830), retrieve mappings from a mapping
system to encapsulate and forward packets. This is done by means of a control-plane channel. In
this short paper we describe three attacks against this channel (Denial-of-Service and overflowing)
as well as the against the local cache used to store such mappings. We also provide a solution against
such attacks that implements a per-source rate-limiter using a Count-Min Sketch data-structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
ID/LOC split protocols build on top of the basic idea of
creating two separate namespaces: overlay (IDs) and un-
derlay (LOCators). Both spaces have their own separate
addresses. Packets use overlay addresses within the sites
and are mapped to an underlay address when transmit-
ted across different overlay sites. This separation brings
several advantages in terms of new features an scalability
of the network (see [1] for further details on this).
Under this principle border routers, that is routers that
connect the overlay with the underlay, need to map over-
lay to underlay address. This mapping is done using the
control-plane and is typically cached locally in the border
router so that subsequent packets addressed to the same
overlay prefix are forwarded directly (fast-path). Sev-
eral approaches are possible when building Locator/ID
split architectures. In this paper we focus on the Loca-
tor/ID Separation Protocol [2][3][4][5][6][7]. In LISP the
mapping from the overlay namespaces can be done us-
ing two mechanisms. In the first one the mapping is
pulled from a control-plane infrastructure (referred as
Mapping System) using two control-plane messages Map-
Request/Map-Reply [4]. In the second one the mappings
use the Publish/Subscribe paradigm [8], following this
architecture xTR subscribe to mappings that are pushed
directly from the Mapping System when they are up-
dated. In both cases the mapping is then cached locally
in the router (referred as xTRs in LISP terminology).
When pulling the mapping using the control-plane
channel attackers can perform a Denial-of-Service or
overflow attack against the control-plane channel and/or
perform a scanning attack against the local cache. In this
paper we discuss these three attacks as well as solutions
to address them. The paper uses the LISP terminology
but the solutions are applicable to similar ID/LOC split
protocols.
II. ATTACKS ON THE CONTROL-PLANE
CHANNEL AND CACHE
A. Scenario
A network is served by a LISP xTR (a LISP-capable
router). The LISP site contains both attackers and legit-
imate users, both are sending data packets towards the
xTR. A lookup is performed for each packet against a
map cache. The map-cache is assumed to use the Least-
Recently Used (LRU) cache replacement policy.
A hit onto the cache means that the packet is encap-
sulated and forwarded. For each missed packet the xTR
generates a Map-Request, each Map-Request requires
storing a nonce (a 64bits nonce in LISP) that is con-
sumed when the corresponding Map-Reply is received.
Once the Map-Reply is received a new entry is installed
onto the map-cache, this entry is used for subsequent
packets addressed towards the same prefix.
In addition the xTR is equipped with a per-destination
EID rate-limiter (e.g., a buffer) for control-plane mes-
sages (i.e., Map-Requests). Once the limit is reached sub-
sequent control-plane messages are dropped. The desti-
nation EID rate-limiter is assumed to reset after a certain
period of time.
B. Denial-of-Service to the control-plane channel
This attacks works as follows:
1. A (set of) attackers(s) generate(s) packets towards
destinations that are not stored in the map-cache.
This can be done by targeting non-popular desti-
nations, unallocated IPv6 address space or prefixes
that are known not to be part of the overlay address
space (negative entries). As an example attackers
can use network scanning software for this purpose.
2. Packets whose destination address is not found in
the map-cache generate a control-plane message
(Map-Request). Each control-plane message in-
creases the rate-limiter.
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23. Once the rate limit is reached victims cannot com-
municate with new destinations since subsequent
Map-Requests are dropped. In some other cases
the attackers may consume more than its fair-share
of control-plane messages disrupting the victim’s
communications.
C. Overflowing the control-plane channel
This attack is a variant of the previous one and can be
mounted using the following steps:
1. A (set of) attacker(s) generate(s) packets that are
not stored in the map-cache. This can be done
by targeting non-popular destinations, unallocated
IPv6 address space or prefixes that are known not
to be part of the overlay address space (negative
entries). As an example attackers can use network
scanning software for this purpose.
2. Packets whose destination address is not found in
the map-cache generate a control-plane message
(Map-Request). Each outgoing control-plane mes-
sage requires storing temporary state in the router,
in the case of LISP this is a 64-bit random nonce
for each control-plane message. This state is con-
sumed once the corresponding Map-Reply message
is received.
3. By generating packets that trigger control-plane
messages fast enough the attacker can overflow the
memory structure used to temporarily store the
nonces.
D. Scanning Attack on the Control-Plane cache
In this case an attacker can use the well-known scan-
ning attack (or cache pollution) [9] [10] to generate cache
evictions thus, disrupting victim’s ongoing flows. The
attack works as follows:
1. One or multiple attackers send packets over a large
period of time (e.g., hours), to destinations having
a high probability of not being found in the cache.
For instance, this can be achieved by having a list
of overlay prefixes (EIDs) and sending packets with
destinations enumerating all prefixes in the list in a
random order and at a certain packet rate. Once all
destinations are exhausted the enumeration would
start over.
2. Such packets generate control-plane messages that
allocate new entries in the cache. If the intensity of
the attack is high enough and/or the cache is not
large enough the cache will not be able to allocate
the new entries. As a result, existing entries will be
evicted according to the cache replacement policy,
for instance the least recently used. This will result
in the disruption of ongoing flows that were using
the evicted entries. Such flows will have to pull
again the mappings causing packet drops and/or
re-routes.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE ATTACK
A. Securing the Control-Plane Channel
In this section we discuss solutions to the attacks de-
scribed in the previous section. It is important to note
that such attacks are well-known by the community since
they apply to many fields of IT infrastructures (e.g., pro-
cessor design [11][12][13]). As a consequence different
mechanism have been proposed to address such attacks,
in this paper we only discuss a subset of the potential
solutions.
1. Base-line Solution
First we discuss a base-line solution for this attack:
The xTR is equipped with a per-source rate-limiter. This
rate-limiter counts how many misses each source node
(inside the LISP site) has triggered. Once the per-source
limit is reached subsequent control-plane messages trig-
gered by this source are dropped. The rate limiter is
zeroed after a certain period of time. It is worth noting
that this solution assumes that spoofing source addresses
is not possible inside the LISP site.
In order to design such solution the xTR is equipped
with a memory structure that counts misses per-source.
The size of the structure scales linearly O(n) with the
number of nodes within the site (n). This is a very well-
known problem in networking and as such several well-
established data-structures can be used to build the per-
source limiter (e.g., a table or a hash-table[14][15][16][17])
that operate at line-speed for certain values of n.
However and if memory size is a concern several more
sophisticated data-structures are available (e.g., bloom
filters [18], count-sketch [19]), such structures while being
able to operate at line rate scale (in terms of memory
size) sub-linearly with the amount of the elements that
need to be counted (e.g., nodes inside the LISP site).
In what follows we describe one of such structures: the
Count-Min Sketch.
2. Count-Min Sketch
The Count-Min Sketch (CMS) [20][21] data structure
provides an efficient way to estimate the frequencies of
given events. It uses compression methods to scale sub-
linearly in size with the amount of elements to count
and approximation techniques to estimate its frequen-
cies. When counting the frequencies of an event, CMS
applies for each row the corresponding hash function and
3FIG. 1. Count-Min Sketch mapping to different positions for
each row
increments the counter. To estimate the frequency of an
event, the minimum of all the counters corresponding to
that event is selected.
The width of the matrix is assumed to be much smaller
than the number of events. The more skewed is the events
distribution, the more accurately CMS will approximate
the values. All rows are pairwise-independent hash func-
tions that will map an event into a specific position from
its corresponding row. The error that a counter value can
have is the collision ratio of two or more events falling
in the same position. In other words, the sketch will
never underestimate the true value of a counter, but it
may overestimate it. To decrease the probability of hav-
ing such error, multiple rows with new independent hash
functions are added to the matrix. The following formu-
las are used to determine the width w and the depth d
of the table, where ε is the error and δ is the certainty:
w =
⌈2
ε
⌉
(3.1)
d =
⌈ log(1− δ)
log(1/2)
⌉
(3.2)
It is worth noting that CMS is a very popular tech-
nique that is being used in production infrastructures,
for instance AT&T as well as Google have deployed it for
heavy-hitter detection [22][23] .
3. Preventing Denial-of-Service and overflowing attacks to
the control-plane channel
This solution addresses the attacks defined in sections
2.2 and 2.3 by implementing a per-source rate-limiter
taking advantage of the efficiency of the CMS data-
structure. An overview of the solution is described in the
following figure. For each data-packet that misses the
map-cache a counter is incremented in the CMS struc-
ture using the source address of the node as key (source
EID). If counter for that source address exceeds a cer-
tain threshold T no control-plane message is generated,
otherwise a control-plane message is generated. Finally,
an aging policy is used to reset all the counters from the
data structure after a specific amount of time p.
FIG. 2. Fair share of flow-table misses
This strategy protects from the previously defined at-
tacks (sections 2.2 and 2.3) since the CMS is used to
efficiently detect attackers (heavy-hitters), that is nodes
that generate more than T control-plane messages each p
seconds. Attackers are rate-limited to T/p control-plane
messages per second.
In order to provide relevant estimates about the size
and accuracy of the CMS structure in real scenarios we
have performed the following experiments. We use a
CMS reference implementation [24] with a fixed size for
each experiment. We consider three network sizes (nodes
within the LISP site): 50k, 100k and 500k with two dif-
ferent amount of attackers, 1% and 10% are assumed to
be attackers.
Attackers generate (randomly) between 2 and 3 orders
of magnitude more control-plane messages than legiti-
mate users. Specifically, attackers generate a uniform
random number in the range of 1k-10k, legitimate users
a range in 1-10 and the threshold T is set to 1k. The
size of the CMS structure starts with w = 1000 and d =
1. The width is being incremented in 1000 in every iter-
ation, and the depth by one unit each 2 iterations. Each
cell of the CMS structure consists in a 2-byte counter.
In our experiments we do not consider the reset timer
since it is irrelevant with respect to the performance of
the CMS structure. Please note that the required CMS
size to count the attackers and/or the accuracy does
not depend on the specific ratio in the intensity of the
control-plane messages generated by attackers and legit-
imate users, but rather on the ratio of attackers with
respect with the legitimate users.
Figure 3 shows the result of the experiments plotting
the false positives for different CMS memory sizes and
three network scenarios (50k, 100k and 500k). A false
positive is when a legitimate user is incorrectly identified
as an attacker. As the figure shows the amount of false
positive decreases as the size of the CMS increases, this
is because in larger structures legitimate users do not
collide with attackers. In all three network scenarios and
for a certain CMS size the false positive drop to zero,
as an example at 56KB for 50k nodes. As a reference a
traditional linear structure (e.g., a table) would require
at least 100KB of memory. If an error lower than 0.1% is
acceptable, then size of the CMS structure drops to 30KB
4FIG. 3. False positive detection of attacks as a function of
the CMS size (KB) when 1% of nodes are attackers
FIG. 4. False positive detection of attacks as a function of
the CMS size (KB) when 10% of nodes are attackers
for 50k nodes. We also plot in figure 4 an scenario with
10% of attackers, in this case the CMS structure requires
a size of 288KB for 50k nodes with zero error and 168KB
for errors below 0.1%. It is worth noting that the CMS
structure does not underestimate the values and as such
false negative are negligible.
Finally it is worth noting that similar structures con-
sidering commensurate sizes have been implemented in
switches operating at line-rate. We refer the interested
reader to [25] for further information on heavy hitter de-
tection.
B. Securing the Control-Plane Cache
Cache scanning attacks are well-known in the IT field
and as a result a wide plethora of solutions have been pro-
posed for this. In particular cache replacement policies
have been designed to specifically mitigate such attacks.
Notable examples are the Least Frequently Used (LFU)-
Aging [26] [27] [28], ARC [29], Least Recently Frequently
Used (LRFU)[30][31] and the Least Frequent Recently
Used (LFRU)[32].
As an example a LFU-A [27][28] replacement policy
works by evicting the cache entry with less hits (less pack-
ets addressed towards this destination) when the cache
is full. In addition and after a certain amount of time
the reference counts for popular entries is decremented
(or zeroed) to make them candidates for replacement.
Under such policy attackers must generate as much
traffic as the traffic addressed to popular destinations in
order to disrupt them. We refer the interested reader to
[33] for further details about this topic.
IV. DISCUSSION
The main design rationale behind the proposed solu-
tion is to detect and push-back attackers by rate-limiting
them in aggregating points. This is a common practice in
network operation that seeks mitigating security threats
as topologically close as possible to the attackers. In what
follows we discuss the main assumptions of this solution:
Spoofing: The security mechanism proposed in this
paper assumes that the network serviced by the xTR
has deployed spoofing prevention mechanisms. This is as
a reasonable assumption in managed IT infrastructures
such as 5G or Data-Center scenarios. If the network does
not deploy anti-spoofing mechanisms then a wide-range
of attacks are possible, in some scenarios such attacks
attacks are more disruptive than the one described in
this paper.
What is the source in the per-source rate-
limiter? The proposed solution is assumed to count
source IP addresses, however the solution can be trivially
adapted to count any other field of the packets such as
MAC address or information provided by the network in-
frastructure (e.g, Ethernet ports or wireless access point
information). This enables the solution to count misses
with different granularities.
On the ratio of attackers: The performance of the
CMS depends on the ratio of attackers with respect to
the size of the nodes serviced by the xTR. Typically it
is assumed that the attackers represent a small portion
of the overall population, this results in skewed statisti-
cal distributions that enable efficient use of the resources
(e.g, CMS, caching, etc). If this assumption does not
hold then the resources have to be provisioned for the
worst-case (e.g, 100% of the nodes are attackers). This
means that some elements of the data-plane must store
the full network state resulting in inefficient use of the
resources as well as increased CAPEX.
In short, if these assumptions do not hold alternative
LISP deployment models can be used where some LISP
elements store all the network state [34].
V. SUMMARY
In this short paper we have described two attacks
to the control-plane channel and cache of pull-based
ID/LOC split protocols. The first attacks aims to DoS
or overflow the control-plane channel, for this attack we
have described a solution that implements a per-source
rate-limiter that takes advantage of the CMS structure,
5this structure operates at line-rate and scales sub-linearly
with the amount of nodes in terms of size. The second at-
tack is a scanning attack against the control-plane cache,
this is a well-known topic and we have pointed the inter-
ested reader to a set of already existing solutions. Finally
in the paper we have borrowed the LISP (RFC6830) ter-
minology but both the attacks and the solutions can be
applied to any pull-based ID/LOC split protocol.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been partially supported by the Span-
ish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under con-
tract TEC2017-90034-C2-1-R (ALLIANCE project) that
receives funding from FEDER and by the Catalan Insti-
tution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA).
[1] A. Cabellos-Aparicio and D. Saucez, An Architec-
tural Introduction to the Locator/ID Separation Pro-
tocol (LISP), Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lisp-introduction-
13 (Internet Engineering Task Force, 2015) work in
Progress.
[2] D. Farinacci, V. Fuller, D. Meyer, and D. Lewis, “The
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP),” RFC 6830
(2013).
[3] D. Farinacci, V. Fuller, D. Meyer, D. Lewis, and
A. Cabellos-Aparicio, The Locator/ID Separation Pro-
tocol (LISP), Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-
11 (Internet Engineering Task Force, 2018) work in
Progress.
[4] V. Fuller and D. Farinacci, “Locator/ID Separation Pro-
tocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface,” RFC 6833 (2013).
[5] V. Fuller, D. Farinacci, and A. Cabellos-Aparicio,
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Control-Plane,
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis-09 (Internet En-
gineering Task Force, 2018) work in Progress.
[6] A. Rodriguez-Natal, J. Paillisse, F. Coras, A. Lopez-
Bresco, L. Jakab, M. Portoles-Comeras, P. Natarajan,
V. Ermagan, D. Meyer, D. Farinacci, F. Maino, and
A. Cabellos-Aparicio, IEEE Communications Magazine
55, 32 (2017).
[7] A. Rodriguez-Natal, M. Portoles-Comeras, V. Ermagan,
D. Lewis, D. Farinacci, F. Maino, and A. Cabellos-
Aparicio, IEEE Communications Magazine 53, 201
(2015).
[8] A. Rodriguez-Natal, V. Ermagan, J. Leong, F. Maino,
A. Cabellos-Aparicio, S. Barkai, D. Farinacci, M. Bou-
cadair, C. Jacquenet, and stefano.secci@lip6.fr, Pub-
lish/Subscribe Functionality for LISP , Internet-Draft
draft-rodrigueznatal-lisp-pubsub-02 (Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force, 2018) work in Progress.
[9] M. Conti, P. Gasti, and M. Teoli, Computer Networks
57, 3178 (2013), information Centric Networking.
[10] Y. Gao, L. Deng, A. Kuzmanovic, and Y. Chen, in Pro-
ceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on
Network Protocols (2006) pp. 54–64.
[11] I. Aad, J.-P. Hubaux, and E. W. Knightly, in Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Mobile
Computing and Networking , MobiCom ’04 (ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 2004) pp. 202–215.
[12] I. Aad, J. P. Hubaux, and E. W. Knightly, IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking 16, 791 (2008).
[13] Q. Yan and F. R. Yu, IEEE Communications Magazine
53, 52 (2015).
[14] Y. K. Chang and Y. C. Lin, in 2009 International Con-
ference on Advanced Information Networking and Appli-
cations (2009) pp. 278–284.
[15] W. Eatherton, G. Varghese, and Z. Dittia, SIGCOMM
Comput. Commun. Rev. 34, 97 (2004).
[16] T. Kijkanjanarat and H. J. Chao, in Global Telecom-
munications Conference, 1999. GLOBECOM ’99 , Vol. 2
(1999) pp. 1570–1575 vol.2.
[17] M. A. Ruiz-Sanchez, E. W. Biersack, and W. Dabbous,
IEEE Network 15, 8 (2001).
[18] H. Song, S. Dharmapurikar, J. Turner, and J. Lockwood,
in Proceedings of the 2005 Conference on Applications,
Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer
Communications, SIGCOMM ’05 (ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 2005) pp. 181–192.
[19] G. Cormode and M. Hadjieleftheriou, Proc. VLDB En-
dow. 1, 1530 (2008).
[20] G. Cormode and S. Muthukrishnan, Journal of Algo-
rithms 55, 58 (2005).
[21] G. Cormode and S. Muthukrishnan, IEEE Software 29,
64 (2012).
[22] M. Charikar, K. Chen, and M. Farach-Colton, in Au-
tomata, Languages and Programming, edited by P. Wid-
mayer, S. Eidenbenz, F. Triguero, R. Morales, R. Conejo,
and M. Hennessy (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2002) pp. 693–703.
[23] G. Cormode, T. Johnson, F. Korn, S. Muthukrishnan,
O. Spatscheck, and D. Srivastava, in Proceedings of the
2004 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Man-
agement of Data, SIGMOD ’04 (ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 2004) pp. 35–46.
[24] T. Barrus, (2017).
[25] V. Sivaraman, S. Narayana, O. Rottenstreich,
S. Muthukrishnan, and J. Rexford, in Proceedings
of the Symposium on SDN Research, SOSR ’17 (ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 2017) pp. 164–176.
[26] M. Arlitt, L. Cherkasova, J. Dilley, R. Friedrich, and
T. Jin, SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev. 27, 3 (2000).
[27] P. Jayarekha and T. R. G. Nair, CoRR abs/1001.4135
(2010), arXiv:1001.4135.
[28] J. T. Robinson and M. V. Devarakonda, SIGMETRICS
Perform. Eval. Rev. 18, 134 (1990).
[29] N. Megiddo and D. S. Modha, in Proceedings of the 2Nd
USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies,
FAST ’03 (USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA,
2003) pp. 115–130.
[30] D. Lee, J. Choi, J.-H. Kim, S. H. Noh, S. L. Min, Y. Cho,
and C. S. Kim, SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev. 27,
134 (1999).
[31] D. Lee, J. Choi, J. H. Kim, S. H. Noh, S. L. Min, Y. Cho,
and C. S. Kim, IEEE Trans. Comput. 50, 1352 (2001).
[32] M. Bilal and S. G. Kang, IEEE Access 5, 1692 (2017).
[33] F. Coras, J. Domingo-Pascual, D. Lewis, and
A. Cabellos-Aparicio, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Net-
6working 24, 506 (2016).
[34] A. Rodriguez-Natal, V. Ermagan, F. Maino, and
A. Cabellos-Aparicio, LISP control-plane for Identi-
fier Locator Addressing (ILA), Internet-Draft draft-
rodrigueznatal-ila-lisp-00 (Internet Engineering Task
Force, 2018) work in Progress.
